

DDI:

FYI: You might
want to bring this
to [redacted] STAT
attention.

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4/1/82

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NIO/SP	X			
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 9 April
Date

Remarks: For comment to the Acting DCI. Please prepare a response for the Acting DCI. As an alternative to a written response, a discussion of the DIRNSA's suggestion may be an appropriate topic for an NFIB meeting.

D/Executive Secretary
31 Mar 82
Date

2637 (10-81)

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N0362
30 March 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposal for Restructuring NIE 11-3/8: Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict (C)

1. (C) At the NFIB meeting on 23 March at which we discussed NIE 11-3/8-81: Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict I joined the other Board Members in praising the quality of the paper, the advances made over previous versions and the efforts of all those involved in its production. I also suggested that, with the estimate still fresh in our minds, the Board should consider as soon as possible how we might handle the subject better in the future because I believe that both the process and the product can be further improved. This memorandum offers some suggestions for producing an estimate that would be more timely, more easily produced and more policy-relevant.

2. (S) NIE 11-3/8-81 required a very lengthy coordination process and to my mind was too voluminous. It was also not produced in response to specific questions of US Government policy makers. I propose that the 1982 edition of NIE 11-3/8 be pared down with some sections being produced independently:

--The material on current and future Soviet strategic weapon programs, to include force projections, should be published separately as a "Handbook of Soviet Strategic Systems." (This material currently is contained in Chapters 1 and 3, and in Volume III.) Data in the new handbook can be updated (e.g., by WSSIC and its subcommittees) with continual replacement of pages as needed;

--The material on Soviet force operations for nuclear war (currently contained in Chapter 2) also should be published separately, perhaps as an NIE which need not be updated more than every two or three years.

3. (S) The restructured NIE would, thus, consist of:

--Judgments, keyed to specific questions and concerns posed by policy makers (the National Security Council). Judgments of this sort do not appear in this year's NIE because such policy-relevant questions were not asked of the NIE process;

--A summary of new developments, including significant changes in weapon characteristics, deployments, force operations, and significant changes in judgments from previous NIEs. This type of material currently appears in the Key Judgments volume;

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--A discussion of Soviet ability to prosecute a nuclear war, as currently contained in Chapter 4.

4. (S) The following benefits would accrue from revising the NIE:

--Technical aspects of Soviet weapons development, operational aspects of deployment, and computerized modeling of force projections would be handled outside the NIE process by technical experts in already established fora. Prolonged debate over relatively less important issues would be relegated to technical channels. Updates could be made quickly and disseminated in a timely manner;

--Soviet doctrine, for nuclear force operations, which changes relatively slowly and which spawns prolonged hypothetical discussions based on long-standing institutional positions, need not be presented in NIE 11-3/8 and need not be reviewed annually, in any event;

--The revised NIE would address what it needs to address, namely, Soviet ability to wage a nuclear war during the next decade. It would present relevant additional material, such as major significant developments of the past year. More importantly, it would draw conclusions for US policy, based on issues of concern to policy makers.



LINCOLN D. FAURER
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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Executive Secretary, NFIB

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